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Safety-critical applications often use dependability cases to validate that specified properties
are invariant, or to demonstrate a counterexample showing how that property might be
violated. However, most dependability cases are written with a single product in mind. At
the same time, software product lines (families of related software products) have been
studied with the goal of modeling variability and commonality and building family-based
techniques for both modeling and analysis. This thesis presents a novel approach for building
an end to end dependability case for a software product line, where a property is formally
modeled, a counterexample is found and then validated as a true positive via testing. There
has not been such a study that we know of in an emerging safety-critical domain, specifically
of robotic surgery. This thesis will detail a study on a family of surgical robots that combine
hardware and software components and are highly configurable, representing over 1300
unique robots. At the same time, these robot systems are considered safety-critical and
should have associated dependability cases. We conducted a case study to understand how
we can bring together lightweight formal analysis, feature modeling, and testing to provide an
end to end pipeline to find potential violations of important safety properties. In the process,
we learned that there are some interesting and open challenges for the research community,
which if solved will lead towards more dependable safety-critical cyber-physical systems.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are a class of systems that integrate computation with physical
systems. In these systems, computers sense and control processes in the physical world and
physical processes affect computations. Recently, these systems have been widely used in
safety-critical areas, such as automotive systems, traffic control, aircraft, military systems,
and medical devices [26]. Due to their increasing relevance in safety-critical applications, it is
of utmost importance to ensure that CPS operates without faults, as faults and undesired
behavior in safety-critical systems can lead to catastrophic events. In Cyber-Physical Systems,
hardware-software controls are tightly interweaved with hardware, which impacts the selected
configuration of the software. Additionally, software computationally enforces the constraints
of the hardware in these systems.
The open problem of safety assurance and dependability in safety-critical systems is not a
new one, and there is ongoing research on finding improved and more reliable ways to ensure
safety. Some well-known examples of failure in safety-critical systems include the Ariane V
launch failure [25], the losses of Mars Polar Lander and the Mars Climate Orbiter [4] [6],
and the unsafe administration of radiation from the Therac-25 medical linear accelerator
that led to severe injury or death in several patients [41]. The most recent example of a high
profile cyber-physical and safety-critical system failure is the case of Boeing B-737 MAX
fatal accidents [37] that left 347 people dead in two different crashes. All these different cases
2of malfunction and failure in safety-critical systems strengthen the argument that system
dependability must be a more rigorous and comprehensive process so that these disastrous
events can be prevented.
An instance of using CPS in a safety-critical area is robotic surgery, in which robots
are controlled by surgeons from a console to perform delicate and complex procedures.
These surgical robots can be configured in multiple ways and for different types of surgeries,
and they use various physical and virtual components. For instance, they can perform
dissections, cautery, or sew an entry wound closed. They can be used for general, cardiac,
and gynecologic surgeries and on different types of patients. The robotic surgery systems are
highly configurable and can be viewed as a family of robots (i.e., a software product line),
leading to hundreds if not thousands of possible configurations. The surgeon can choose
their desired configuration for performing specific tasks and satisfying his or her personal
preferences. This fact makes ensuring the dependability of these systems more challenging,
as their configurability adds many layers of logic and complexity to the system.
Dependability in robotic surgery systems is crucial as some possible outcomes of a system
failure are injury and loss of human life. Thus, these systems must be reliable and dependable.
One way to establish confidence about dependability is to provide direct evidence that the
system satisfies its claimed dependability goals [19]. Ensuring the safety and dependability
of safety-critical systems is not an easy task, mainly since such systems usually consist of
many software and hardware components. In the case of highly configurable surgery robots,
the plug-and-play nature of the robot system makes ensuring dependability a much more
challenging task, since all the different valid combinations of system features need to be
considered when safety and dependability are verified.
In this thesis, the goal is to understand the challenges and feasibility of assuring the
safety of a highly-configurable safety critical cyber-physical system. I present an approach
for building a dependability case for such a system that considers both the variability and
3safety of the system. This approach uses lightweight formal methods to model systems and
performs automated analysis of the models, verifying safety-critical properties. On the other
hand, it uses feature modeling to reason about the different configurations and products
of a system. The last step of this approach is to test the concrete instances of systems in
a guided, yet narrowly scoped manner to check and see whether any existing violation of
the properties would manifest in reality. The case study for presenting this approach is a
particular research prototype for a family of miniature surgical robots designed and built
by the Center for Advanced Surgical Technology [2] at the University of Nebraska Medical
Center and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln to perform minimally invasive laparoscopic
surgery. The robots are controlled and configured by software designed and implemented for
a variety of different robots. The software is open-source and available for all researchers and
engineers to add new ”plug-ins,” which are modules that add new functionality to the robot
control software. With its open source software, this family of surgical robot systems provides
a valuable learning playground for us to explore. Two essential elements that distinguish this
approach from prior efforts at safety analysis are as follows:
• Family-level reasoning: By identifying commonality and variability in the system and
explicitly modeling them in analyzable specification languages, the approach performs
family-wide reasoning that would be difficult to achieve using static analysis or testing.
For example, the analysis can explore all possible systems in which a particular type of
robot arm is being installed and check whether the use of that robot arm along with
any other software/hardware components can lead to a violation of a safety property.
• Guided testing on concrete instances: While rigorous and exhaustive analyses of
a formal, yet abstract, model of the system family can help pinpoint potential property
violations, one more step is needed to confirm the identified violations are indeed
realistic. In particular, the approach supports the formal analysis with targeted testing
4of the concrete system to verify whether the identified property violation can result in
practical issues. The counter examples produced by the formal reasoning are leveraged
at this step to guide the testing on concrete family instances.
The main contributions of this thesis are the following:
1. A novel approach for building dependability cases for families of systems, and the
demonstration of a potential synergy between a lightweight formal approach and feature
modeling techniques for a safety analysis of a family of a surgical robots.
2. An end-to-end case study to validate an important physical property for a family of
surgical robots is presented. The approach is implemented on this family to confirm
the feasibility and address the challenges.
3. A set of lessons learned and discussion of future directions for assuring cyber-physical
product lines.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the background
and related work. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the surgical robot family. Chapter 4
goes into the details of the approach, and Chapter 5 describes the process of constructing
the dependability case for the surgical robot family. Chapter 6 provides the analysis and the
results obtained after building the dependability case. Chapter 7 presents some discussions,
challenges, and lessons learned along the way. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis with a
summary of the contributions and the visions for future work.
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Background and Related Work
In this chapter, I provide background and related work on safety and dependability of
safety-critical cyber-physical systems and various approaches to ensuring dependability.
There have been various works on safety and dependability assessment of critical systems.
A study on cost-effective, dependable software is presented in [10], and different approaches
are suggested for assessing the safety and dependability of software. Traditional approaches for
ensuring system safety and dependability are process-based, and the software is considered
dependable and safe as long as it abides by one or more sets of standards. The process-based
approach usually results in low-defect code, but they do not provide arguments about how
the system satisfies critical properties. The safety standards recommend processes that must
be utilized to achieve different levels of safety [30]. On the other hand, evidence-based
approaches seek explicit evidence of safety, and define failure models of the software and use
various approaches to ensure that the hazardous states are not reached. The results of formal
verification of the system specification, model checking, static code analysis, or testing can
be considered as evidence for software safety. Kelly and Weaver [23] presented a technique
called Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to improve the structure, rigor, and clarity of safety
arguments. In this method, the claims of the argument are established as goals and items
of evidence are documented in solutions [32]. Graydon et al. [17] presented a methodology
based on GSN to co-develop a system with its assurance case, to enable the assurance needed
6to drive development choices in each stage of development to build dependable software. In
this approach, the sub-properties that constitute the high-level system property are checked
with methods like testing, or formal verification.
A safety case is built for a cruise control system in the automotive domain in [42]. The
hazards and the requirements the system needs to fulfill to avoid those hazards are identified,
and a framework for constructing a safety case for this domain is suggested. For different
hazards and failures in the system, various methods of producing evidence are suggested.
Another study [36] suggests a new way to construct safety cases in automotive systems, with
the goal of presenting a concrete and organized method to build systems that realize a specific
standard. In their approach, the evidence comes from tracing the safety requirements of the
system into their respective development artifacts in which they are realized. Graydon et
al. have suggested an approach to increase clarity when it comes to claims that the system
adheres to the safety goals [16]. They suggest using conformance arguments to clearly show
how each sub-claim is satisfied to achieve the overall safety goal, and if the evidence used
is sufficient to claim safety. The arguments are also used to clarify how the developers
have interpreted the safety requirements. In their case study, they use a formal analysis
technique and testing results as evidence to support their sub-claims. Denney et al. describe
their approach for creating a safety case for an autopilot software for an aircraft [13]. Their
approach adopts goal-based argumentation for linking evidence (e.g., results of software
verification) to claims that hazards are mitigated. Bourdil et al. present a methodology for
structuring the formal models and the reasoning necessary to prove a claim on system design,
relying on verification argument construction. In this method, which is applied to check the
reliability of a critical function on an autonomous rover, the claims are linked with formal
models and a rationale about how those model elements meet their requirements [7]. Sullivan
et al. use apply bounded exhaustive testing to a complex software system to accomplish
software assurance. They use the formal specification of the most critical parts of the system,
7identify the test oracles, generate a set of program inputs and automatically create test cases
for testing that input on the system [39]. Gacek et al. leverage model checking in building
an assurance case language for architecture models in [14]. Their framework automatically
generates assurance cases based on a system model described in an architectural design
language, rules written in a domain specific language, and results of other forms of formal
analyses. Another use of verification tools in checking safety critical systems is presented in
[40], in which a model checker is used to verify the critical properties of a pacemaker.
Brunel and Chemouil, use Alloy to evaluate the safety of fire detection system [8]. Brunel
et al. also use Alloy in [9] to establish the security of an Avionic Architecture. Near et al.
construct a dependability case [33] for the control software of a proton therapy machine with
modeling the property using the Problem Frames approach, performing lightweight code
analysis to extract the relevant information of the code related to the property. Pernsteiner
et al. [34] investigate the safety of a Radiotherapy Machine by developing specialized tools
to verify the safety properties of individual components, and using Alloy to check whether
the overall system-level property holds. A comprehensive study of different types of safety
evidence, their structuring, and their assessment is presented in [32].
Our evidence-based approach is closely related to [34, 33], as we also use the property-part
diagram [20] to informally build the dependability case, and then we formalize the high-level
property it in Alloy. One of the differences in our approach comes from the fact that we
are constructing the dependability case for a family of surgical robots. To achieve that goal,
we are using code analysis to automatically extract detailed information to build individual
Alloy models that conform to the meta-model, and we then check the dependability of the
system by checking the property on each of the surgical robots that are defined in and can
be controlled with the system. We have also used a combination of verification and analysis
in our work, using feature models for studying the variability in the system and finding valid
configurations to be tested.
8Other recent approaches to assuring safety-critical systems include using model-based
techniques [15], architecture-based safety analysis [38], and techniques based on real world
types and type checking [44]. The majority of these approaches, however, are subject to
a common limitation: they are intended to ensure safety in a single system, but fail to
recognize commonality and variability in the system. These approaches do not ensure the
dependability of a highly configurable safety-critical cyber-physical system. Other research
has examined testing cyber-physical product lines [28]; however, this work does not address
the safety-critical aspects of the system. There has also been research on test generation
for product lines using lightweight formal analyzers such as Alloy [24]; however, this thread
of work again does not address safety-critical properties of the system. Last, Proctor et al.
proposed an architecture description language extension for AADL for connected medical
devices. This approach can reason about medical apps in general [35] but it does not directly
provide support for our use case, dependability cases for families of safety-critical devices,
such as surgical robots.
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Overview of the Surgical Robots Family
This chapter presents an overview of the surgery robot system. I discuss the overall architecture
of the system, followed by the details of the physical and software components of the system.
As opposed to open surgery, the traditional form of surgery in which the surgeon makes
large incisions to access the body part under operation, minimally invasive laparoscopic
procedures introduce many improvements in different aspects. These procedures have benefits
such as reduced scarring, and less post-operative discomfort due to smaller incisions, quicker
recovery times, and shorter hospital stays. Despite the benefits of these surgeries, there are
also limitations such as reduced dexterity, and limited motion of medical instruments [11].
Using robotic platforms for performing such procedures expands the workspace, increases
dexterity, and it gives the surgeon finer control during the procedure. The Advanced Surgical
Technologies Laboratory at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL) is one of only a handful
of institutes in the world developing in vivo surgical devices. The latest developments include
miniature in vivo surgical robots for use in robotic laparo-endoscopic single-site (R-LESS)
surgery procedures [29, 11].
These miniature surgical robots are small and do not need a dedicated customized surgical
suite or infrastructure. They have reusable disposable tools that are familiar to surgeons, and
they can be operated locally or remotely from a small console that includes haptic feedback
and a screen that virtualizes robotic positioning. The robot system that has been developed
10
Figure 3.1: System components involved in arm movement.
includes multiple modules and plug-ins for different types of hardware control. The robot
control software, which is written in C# and is available as open-source [12], can be manually
configured, and the robots can be controlled via a graphical user interface. Two types of
graphical user interfaces can be visible while using the robot system. One of these GUIs
shows the values of the robotic equation calculations and outputs and is suitable for testing
purposes. The other GUI shows the live feed of where the robotic end effector is and what
parts are under operation. This system supports different robot arms, some of which have
haptic feedback, and some that do not. Different solvers are developed to control the physical
movements of corresponding arms, and other plug-ins are designed to perform tool position
tracking, simulation, video, and voice communication. The source code that controls the
physical aspects of the robot also supports a simulation environment. The simulation support
is useful for developing correct solvers for robotic devices that aren’t physically available but
are virtually built and represented through simulation software.
The control software transforms the movements of the Touch device to set the position of
the end effectors of the robot arms. The robot control software receives a set of coordinates
from the software layer for the Touch device. Based on the chosen plug-ins and the configura-
11
(a) Remote surgeon user interface for the robot
control platform
(b) Programmable pedals for the robotic surgery
system
Figure 3.2: Physical control components of the robotic surgery system
tion, it is specified which inverse kinematic solver should be used for the current robot arm.
The solver will then transform the coordinates into corresponding arm angles. The system has
multiple architectural layers that correspond to different layers of the software system. The
overall architecture of the robot system is presented in Figure 3.1. The physical components
of the robotic system are shown in green boxes, and the software layer components are shown
as blue boxes. The software has 56 different plug-ins as of November 2019 [12], but I have
only included the very basic and essential plug-ins to work in a robot in the architecture
figure. More on this topic is presented in section 3.2.
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3.1 Physical Components
Figure 3.3: A Two Armed Robot
The surgical robot system’s physical control
setup is shown in Figure 3.2a The primary
device that is given to the surgeons to con-
trol the robot arm movements is a Geomagic
Touch Device. There can be either one or
two of these devices, depending on the num-
ber of robot arms. Each of them can control
one of the arms. Touch is a motorized device
that applies force feedback to the user’s hand,
allowing the surgeon to feel virtual objects
and producing true to life touch sensations
as the user manipulates the 3D objects on
the screen [1].
The programmable pedals shown in Figure 3.2b are assigned to different functions that
the surgeon can use during surgery. Two of the pedals should always be assigned to clutch
and home position functions to enable/disable these functions in the control software. Clutch
is to temporarily lock the arms in place while the GeomagicTouch device can get freely
repositioned to a place more comfortable for the surgeon. Home Position clutch is used
to reset the software/hardware device space so that the software is properly synced with
information on where the effectors are. The third pedal can be assigned to another function,
such as scale or cautery. Not that the cautery and scale function cannot be used in the
same configuration, as a pedal should be assigned to only one, and the scale function is not
necessary while using the cautery function.
The robot arm is the other physical component of the system, which has a number of
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motor controllers to which the software layer sends serial data to move the robotic arm [11].
Each robot arm can have a number of joints, and each joint has an angle limit. Each robot
arm is also connected to an end effector that can perform a specific task in surgery, such as
shears for cutting or a cautery hook for cauterizing the wounds.
3.2 Software components
The Geomagic Touch software component provides a connection between the physical Geo-
magic Touch device and the software system. The system receives its coordinates from the
Geomagic Touch endpoint and sends the coordinates to other components. This component
also receives the haptic feedback force value from the solver plug-in, and a force is applied to
the surgeon’s hand if necessary in the form of a vibration. The Geomagic Touch software is
written in C++, and the robot control system developer has developed a software layer that
enables the Geomagic Touch software integration with the rest of the C# code base.
The Kinematics software component contains a set of kinematic models, which are specific
to the hardware being used (i.e. the arm). They use inverse kinematic solvers for different
arms of the robots. These solvers contain the necessary calculations to transform coordinates
from one space to another. The solvers receive the coordinates from the RobotApp component,
which receives the coordinates from the aforementioned Geomagic Touch Software component.
The corresponding solver to the arm calculates the joint angles for each joint of the robot
arm, and sends them back to the RobotApp component.
The RobotApp component, which contains a set of plugins, employs the Model-View-
View-Model pattern. The use of this pattern facilitates the separation of the development of
the graphical layout of the user interface from the development for the back-end logic of the
application. The graphical user interface is shown in Figure 3.4. The software GUI shows
the available plug-ins on the left panel, and based on the desired configuration, the user can
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load a number of plugins for each of the arms. The necessary plugins for the basic single
robot arm movement are a Geomagic Touch plugin, a solver plugin, a clutch plugin, and a
home position plugin. When the user clicks on any of the loaded plugins, its configuration
panel appears on the right side of the GUI. There are additional options for the plugin, and
the user can specify the flow of information from each plugin to another by specifying the
values in the Signal Output Mappings view of the panel. For the robots built in CAST [2],
the developers and mechanical engineers specified these configurations and saved them as
configuration files. The hardware configuration of the corresponding robot is also stored
in the configuration part, as controller configuration. Each robot arm has an immutable
controller configuration, and the solver that calculates its angles is also an invariant. But
the robot arm be configured to use a combination of different software plugins. In a typical
scenario, the Geomagic Touch plug-in sends the coordinates to the Home Position plug-in,
which in turn sends the updates plug-in to the Clutch plug-in. The Clutch plug-in sends
its output as an input to the Inverse Kinematic plug-in, which connects to the solver to
calculate the angle setpoints for the robotic arm.
Other components of the software also interact with a set of plugins. For instance, the
Geomagic Touch software component interacts with the Geomagic Touch plugin, which
facilitates sending the coordinates to the other plugins, such as a Solver plugin. A solver
plugin sends the coordinates to the correct solver for a chosen robot arm while receiving the
joint angles from the Kinematics component. There are also other plugins in the system that
manipulate the input in other different ways. Some of the plugins are necessary to load for
the way that the system is designed, such as Clutch and HomePosition, and some of them
are only loaded for specific states or actions, such as GrasperLimits.
The Robot Control component is used to abstract a specific set of motors, control modules,
and robot-specific parameters. It handles control and data services to discover, control,
configure, and read motor control modules [11].
15
The Communication component provides a mechanism that facilitates the robot-computer
communication, supporting serial communication and sending the robot commands as serial
data to the robot.




This chapter presents a novel approach for building a dependability case for families of
systems1. A dependability case is defined as an explicit, end-to-end argument that a system
satisfies a critical property [33]. It is necessary to provide concrete evidence that the property
is satisfied. One way to produce such concrete evidence is by utilizing software verification
methods [34]. Dependability cases are usually constructed for single instances of systems,
whereas our presented approach is designed not only for one single system but with a family
of systems in mind. A family of systems can be described as a product line, borrowing the
concept of Software Product Lines (SPLs) [43] to describe the variability and commonality
within the family. SPLs are a set of systems that share common features, and combinations
of those features that follow the system constraints create valid products. In SPLs, units that
build the software are called features, and they can modify the functionality of the software
system in specific ways. A family of systems can be described in a feature model, which is a
model that specifies the features and the system constraints using a hierarchal tree diagram
and cross-tree constraints. The concept of SPL can be extended to include different hardware
and software features, and configurations of the system that combine different hardware
and software components can be created. Constructing a dependability case for an entire
1The approach described in this chapter has been presented in my published paper ”Modeling and testing
a family of surgical robots: an experience report” [27].
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Figure 4.1: Overview of our approach
product line requires formal modeling and feature modeling of the system, and then mapping
the models to one another to study the valid configurations and verify the correctness of
the safety-critical property in them. The approach incorporates both an informal modeling
approach, the problem frames approach [21], to specify the requirements for establishing
the safety-critical property, and a lightweight formal language and analysis tool, known as
Alloy [18] to determine the necessary components to satisfy the property and analyze the
property. However, It is important to note that the approach is independent of any particular
modeling language. The reason our team decided on using Alloy as the formal specification
language, was its declarative and relational nature and its automated analyzer that facilitates
checking the safety-critical properties. At last, if potential problems are found by means of
verification, they can be validated via a method such as testing on the real system.
Figure 4.1 shows an overview of the process to construct a dependability case for a family
of systems. The natural first step for building a dependability case is getting familiar with the
system, its architecture, and the components that are involved in satisfying a safety-critical
property. Carrying out this step requires comprehensive studying of the documentation,
artifacts, and the codebase of the system. Interviews with domain experts also helps with
building a knowledge base about a system when proper documentation is not available. The
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choice of the method in which the architectural is described is up to the person who is
constructing the dependability case, as they might see a particular language or modeling
approach fit for expressing their system.
We then build the feature model using the domain expert knowledge and information from
relevant parts of the code. We then define a safety-critical property for the system, a property
whose correctness is essential for the system. An informal modeling approach such as the
problem frames approach can be used to model the requirements and all the sub-properties
that lead to the correctness of overall safety-critical property. A property-part diagram for
the safety-critical property of system can help outline the necessities for constructing the
formal model, by showing which parts of the system satisfy those sub-properties. We can
then use the informal model as a basis for specifying the safety-critical property in a formal
manner. We build an Alloy meta-model that describes the necessary system components to
satisfy a property, their relationships, and the safety-critical property to be checked. The
software layer helps us in creating individual Alloy models of each family in the system, which
facilitates the process of reasoning about the system configurations from the feature models.
Since Alloy provides exhausting model searching within an specific and pre-defined bound,
it can create instances of the system that can be mapped to the feature model configurations.
We do not have to determine all the different features in Alloy, only the ones that can make
distinctive difference in verifying the correctness. The Alloy Analyzer is able to give us
counterexamples showing instances of property violation, and these instances can be mapped
to slices of feature model. When Alloy shows a counterexample, there are some features
set in those counterexamples. Our feature model included more features compared to the
structural elements we needed to define in Alloy. When applying our approach to a case
study, we created feature model slices with the features that were set in the individual Alloy
models, and generated all the configurations that could be created with setting those features
in the feature model. We also factored in the variability that other features which were not
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described in the Alloy model could cause. These two models are superimposed together to
identify sets of products that potentially violate the specified property.
The generated configurations in the feature model that are informed by the Alloy counterex-
amples can help in generating test cases. Formal verification tells us that this configurations
are potentially faulty, but formal methods are known to overapproximate. Thus, the last step
is to validate the counterexamples by creating the exact configurations from the feature model
and testing those configurations. We did this step of the work manually and only applied the
idea of testing on a few configurations. A systematic approach to test the potentially faulty
configurations is left as future work. A further step would be to instantiate and validate
these test cases on the physical system, which is also left as future work.
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Chapter 5
Construction of a Dependability Case for a Family of Surgical
Robots
In this chapter, I describe the details of constructing a dependability case for a family of
surgical robots, using the approach outlined in Chapter 4. The system I am using to portray
the details of building the dependability case is the University of Nebraska surgical robot
system. The approach is applied to this system as a demonstration on a concrete system,
but it can be implemented on any highly-configurable safety-critical cyber-physical system.
As mentioned before, the first step to construct a dependability case is getting familiar
with the system, its architecture, and the components that are involved in satisfying a
safety-critical property. I carried out this step of the work by studying the source of the
system, and conducting a series of interviews with the engineers and developers who worked
on the robot control system. The results of these investigations is presented as an overview
of the architecture and the physical and software components of the system in Chapter 3.
The next step is to find a safety-critical property of the system to build the dependability
case for that property. A safety-critical property is a property that the system needs to
maintain at all times, and a dependability case needs to ensure that the property holds
in all possible scenarios. I selected a critical property of one specific safety feature of the
robot that is important in practice. It is a property that ensures the safety of the patient by
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guaranteeing the surgeon is always aware of the position of the arm within the patient, and
the arm is not positioned in an irregular manner. If violated, the implications are twofold.
First, it means that the arm may extend into unsafe regions of the patient cavity. Second, if
the arm is extended to its maximum position and torque continues, this could potentially
lead to a hardware failure. The property being enforced is as follows:
Arm movement safety property: During the surgery procedure, as the surgeon
moves the control device, the actual position of the robot arm should be the same position
that the surgeon articulates in the control workspace and he/she should be notified if the
arm is pushed outside of its physical range.
Note that the manner in which the surgeon is notified (i.e. via haptic feedback or via
visual messaging) is not specified, so I also consider property violation messages or logs
shown on a screen as a warning measure designated to inform the surgeon of an undesirable
situation.
This property is enforced by the robot controller system, consisting of hardware and
software components, which monitors and drives the system’s physical components. The
dependability case spans the controller system as well as the physical modules involved in
the arm movement, as it is considering all the relevant components of the system that have a
role in satisfying this property.
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows. Section 5.1 presents the informal approach
to modeling, which provides a basis for the formal modeling. Section 5.2 provides the details
of formalizing the model using Alloy as a modeling language and tool. Section 5.3 describes
the feature model and the study on the configurability of the system. Section 5.4 presents
a mapping approach from the formal model to the feature model, and finally, Section 5.5
describes the process of testing some configurations of the system.
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5.1 Informal Modeling in Problem Frames
Modeling and verifying an entire complex software system such as the robot control software
requires a lot of precision and can be quite expensive. Thus, I used the concept of trusted
bases [22] to informally realize the components that are directly involved in satisfying this
critical property. I leveraged the Problem Frames [21] approach to articulate the structure of
the system and the underlying relationship thereof to the requirements [22]. This approach
has a few key concepts that are briefly described below.
After identifying the safety-critical property, the parts of the system and their interactions
are presented using the problem frames approach. This approach distinguishes the existing
parts of the world, denoted as application domain, from the components that need to
be built to solve the problem, denoted as machines. In problem frames, a property on a
software is the specification that the software realized must fulfill.
Using these concepts, I constructed a problem diagram for the arm movement safety
property, shown in Figure 5.1. A box is a representation of a system part that is involved in
satisfying the property; the edges between the boxes represent a shared phenomenon that is
used for the interaction between the parts.
The problem diagram illustrates the structure of the robot control system, which consists
of: (1) physical components, such as the Geomagic Touch device, and the robot arm, (2)
the high-level software components involved in satisfying the safety-critical property. The
software components run on Windows systems that can be connected to robots. The software
is written mostly in the C# programming language, and it distributed across hundreds of
source files.
There is shared phenomena between the system parts, which is the way that they interact
with one another. Examples of these phenomena are signals generated by the Geomagic
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Figure 5.1: Problem diagram for the arm movement safety
different components of software. In the diagram, these phenomena are the labels on the
edges between the parts, and the arrow on each edge shows the direction of information flow
between the parts.
The problem diagram can show a typical scenario in the robot control system. The parts
of the system communicate with one another as follows: The Geomagic Touch Device sends
the coordinates of the end effector in its workspace to the software component RobotApp
Plugins. The RobotApp Plugins send the coordinates to the Kinematic Model, which in turn
sends the coordinates to the appropriate Inverse Kinematic Solver that is associated with
the selected robotic arm. The Inverse Kinematic Solver calculates the angle setpoints and
sends them back to the RobotApp Plugins. I abstract the diagram, and I don’t go into the
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Figure 5.2: Property-part diagram for the arm movement safety
the input, whether before or after the kinematics calculations. After manipulating the input,
the RobotApp Plugins part sends the angle setpoints as events to the Robot Control part,
which finds the appropriate addresses of the joints and sends the serial data to the Robot
Arm, and the robot arm moves to the position that the user intends.
I embellish the problem diagram and build a property-part diagram (Figure 5.2) that
shows how the overall requirement for the safety-critical property is divided into sub-properties
on the individual parts. All the properties are simply and informally stated as events that
lead to other events. This diagram shows how each sub-property is satisfied in either one
component or a combination of components. In other words, the diagram also shows the
dependencies between the properties and the parts. We can see that each part of the system,
while satisfying its own requirement and specification - such as sending coordinates from
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Figure 5.3: Completed property-part diagram for the arm movement safety
safety-critical property. The sequence of events in the system corresponds to the relationship
between properties on the system.
After informally specifying the property and the parts involved in satisfying the property,
I discussed the property and its specification with the domain experts and developers. I asked
them to validate the event flow shown in the diagram. They informed me of a mechanism
that is built to send a feedback force to the surgeon’s hand via the Geomagic Touch Device
when the position articulated by the surgeon is out of bounds for the robot arm. I modified
the property-part diagram to include this mechanism (Figure 5.3). I added this mechanism to
my safety-critical property, as I realized that failure to produce this feedback or any form of
notification, might cause issues and crashes in the system. If the surgeon is trying to position
the robot arm’s end effectors in a position that is out of the robot’s physical bounds and they
are not informed of the physical limits, they might try to push the arm further in a direction
that it can’t reach, and eventually this might lead to the robot arm getting damaged or the
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patient getting hurt.
The dependency structure in the property-part diagram correlates with the argument
that the system establishes the arm movement safety property. If all the different parts of the
system - whether physical or software components - satisfy their specifications, the overall
property holds and the system is acting in a safe manner.
The next step is to formalize this specification and argument. Using lightweight formal
methods, I model the relationship between the properties involved in satisfying the safety
requirement, to establish that these properties can work together to ensure that the property
holds. The property can be automatically checked for validity if formally modeled. This
formal specification can be used as a reusable model to which all the extracted models for
different robots must conform. Section 5.2 provides the details on formal specification of the
system.
5.2 Formal Modeling in Alloy
This section describes a formal model for the surgical robots family in Alloy [18], a lightweight
formal specification language based on a first-order relational logic, with an analysis engine
that performs bounded verification of models. Three main reasons motivate the choice of
Alloy for this study. First, its flexible core, backed with logical and relational operators,
makes Alloy an appropriate language for declarative specification of systems and properties
to be checked (i.e., assertions). Second, its effective module system allows us to split the
overall, complicated family model among several tractable modules. Such a well-structured
module system not only facilitates modeling and integrating different aspects of the system,
but also enables compositional analysis of the system components. Third, the Alloy Analyzer,
Alloy’s backend analysis engine, provides an automated analysis for checking assertions and
generating counterexamples.
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Before diving into the details of the Alloy specification, I give a brief background on the
Alloy language. Alloy is a first-order relational logic in nature. There are values assigned
to variables, and the values of expressions evaluated in the context of a given instance, are
relations [18]. The Alloy Analyzer is designed to provide fully automated analysis and find
instances of a model by searching within the user-specified finite bounds. In a bounded
search, failure to find an instance does not guarantee that an instance does not exist, but
all the generated instances are valid. The Alloy Analyzer can also find counterexamples
to assertions that are written to check some assumptions about the model. Again, since
Alloy performs a bounded check, if a counterexample is not found, the correctness of the
assumption is not guaranteed. But this problem can usually be ignored because of the small
scope hypothesis. This hypothesis argues that a large portion of defects and bugs can be
found by performing tests with all inputs within some small scope [5]. Thus, it is very likely
for the analyzer to find the counterexamples even in small scopes. Sometimes the reason
why the analyzer cannot find a counterexample is that the model is under or over-specified.
Constraining the model in a way that allows the analyzer to find valid instances is essential
when it comes to designing Alloy models.
The Alloy keyword sig represents a signature, which denotes a set of elements in the
universe. Each signature may contain fields, which describes a relation that maps the elements
of the signature to those in the field expression. Abstract signatures are those without any
elements in them, except for the elements that belong to their extensions, which are specified
by the keyword extends. One, lone, and some, and set are some multiplicities that can be
used in declarations in Alloy. One indicates that the set contains only element, lone means
zero or one element, some indicates a non-empty set, and set means a set that can be empty
or not. There are also some quantifiers defined in Alloy that can be used to write logical
statements, such as all (universal quantifier), some (existential quantifier), no (quantifier to
specify that a set does not exist), lone (zero or one exists), and one (exactly one exists).
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Facts are constraints defined in the model that the analyzer will always assume to be true.
Predicates and functions are given names, and may or may not be given parameters. They
are different in that the predicates always produce either a true or false defined by a formula
in the body of the predicate, and functions produce a relation result of a specified type
defined by the expression specified inside the function. Finally, assertions are specified using
the keyword assert, and are checked using the run command. The show command can be
used to ask the analyzer to show the valid instances of the model. More detailed information
about the Alloy specification language can be found in [18].
To carry out the analysis, I start by defining a common Alloy module that models the
fundamentals for the family of surgical robots and the constraints that every family instance
must obey. The property-part diagram (Figure 5.3) and the feature model (Section 5.3) help
inform the Alloy model, as the Alloy model is a formal representation of the system parts
and features and the analyzer provides an automatic analysis engine to verify the property
and find potential flaws. Technically speaking, this Alloy module can be considered as a
meta-model for the family of surgical robots.
Listing 5.1 outlines the meta-model module. The essential element types for each robot
arm are defined as top-level Alloy signatures. I go through the signatures defined one by
one and explain each signature and its corresponding system part. Line 3 defines the input
and output of the system, the Coordinate signature defines the coordinates from the input
device, and the ArmAngle signature defines the arm angles that are calculated and sent to the
robot arm. Next, the hardware components are described. Signatures on lines 5-7 define the
arm side, which can either be left or right. The HapticFeedback signature and its extensions
define whether or not the feedback is available in a particular model (lines 9-11). The robot
arm can be connected to an effector, and based on the interviews our research team did with
the domain experts, we knew of five different effector types, which are defined as signatures
(lines 13-18). The system also includes a set of pedals for enabling/disabling other functions,
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1 module SurgeonRobot
2 //input and output
3 abstract sig ArmAngle , Coordinate {}
4 //hardware components
5 abstract sig Side {}
6 lone sig Le f t extends Side {}
7 lone sig Right extends Side {}
8
9 abstract sig HapticFeedback {}
10 one sig HapticsEnabled extends HapticFeedback {}
11 one sig Hapt icsDisab led extends HapticFeedback {}
12
13 abstract sig EffectorType {}
14 lone sig Cautery Tissue Grasper extends EffectorType {}
15 lone sig Cautery Shears extends EffectorType {}
16 lone sig Cautery Hook extends EffectorType {}
17 lone sig Tissue Grasper extends EffectorType {}
18 lone sig Shears extends EffectorType {}
19
20 abstract sig PedalFunction {}
21 one sig ClutchButton extends PedalFunction {}
22 one sig HPButton extends PedalFunction {}
23 one sig ScaleButton extends PedalFunction {}
24 one sig CauteryButton extends PedalFunction {}
25
26 //each button i s assigned to one function
27 sig PedalButton{
28 as s i gned : one PedalFunction
29 }
30 abstract sig GeomagicTouch {
31 input : one Coordinate ,
32 f o r c e : HapticFeedback ,}
33 abstract one sig Robot {
34 arms : some RobotArm}
35 abstract sig RobotArm{
36 armside : one Side ,
37 armModel : one ArmType ,
38 e f f e c to rType : one EffectorType }
39 //software components
40 abstract sig Plugin {}
41 abstract one sig RobotApp {
42 i n c l ude s : some Plugin }
43 abstract one sig LoadedPlugins {
44 loads : some Plugin }
45 abstract sig SolverFamily {
46 c a l l s : one KinematicModel}
47 //spec i f ies the solver
48 abstract sig KinematicModel{
49 s o l v e rRe su l t : Coordinate −> ArmAngle}
50 abstract sig ArmType {
51 ang l e l im i t : set ArmAngle , //set of a l l the arm angles that are less than limit
52 inver seKSo lver : one KinematicModel}
53 abstract sig RobotControl{
54 output : set ArmAngle ,}
55 one sig Clutch Plug in extends Plugin {}
56 one sig GeomagicTouch plugin extends Plugin {}
57 one sig HomePosition extends Plugin {}
58 one sig GrasperLimits extends Plugin {}
59 one sig Sca l e extends Plugin {}
60 one sig DummyController extends Plugin {}
61 one sig ButtonInte r f ace extends Plugin {
62 setButtonForPedal : some PedalButton}
63 abstract sig So lverP lug in extends Plugin {
64 s o l v e r f am i l y : one SolverFamily
65 }
Listing 5.1: Fundamental structures of the surgical robot family in Alloy
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and there are 4 different pedal functions that can be assigned to them, which are defined as
signatures on lines 20-24. I have also defined a PedalButton signature, with a relation that
maps each PedalFunction to a PedalButton (lines 27-29). The GeomagicTouch control device
is defined as another signature (lines 30-32), including the input and force fields which are
related to the device. The signature Robot (lines 33-34) defines a robot, and has a field that
relates the robot to its arm. The RobotArm signature (lines 35-38) defines the robot arm, and
the fields within the signature define which side, arm type, and effector type are assigned to
the robot arm.
The software components are then described in the model. I define the textsfPlugin
(line 40) signature, the RobotApp signature (lines 41-42) that includes a number of plug-ins,
LoadedPlugins (lines 43-44) that specify the loaded plug-ins in an instance, the SolverFamily
(lines 45-46) that calls a specific KinematicModel which in turn calculates the ArmAngle
by mapping the coordinates to the arm angle setpoints (shown as the relation on line 49).
The ArmType signature (lines 50-52) defines the anglelimit field, which relates to a set of
ArmAngle. The number of arm angles calculated for each arm type is defined and is extracted
from the code base. Each ArmAngle is also related to one KinematicModel. The RobotControl
signature defines the Robot Control component, which sends the output of the system. Lines
55-65 define some plug-ins for the system with some relationships related to them.
Listing 5.2 shows the constraints of the system specified using Alloy facts. Adding these
constraints will help the analyzer remove the non-valid instances. The fact OutputConstraint
specifies that for any RobotControl.output, ArmAngles should be produced by a solver in
the system. SingleKinematicModelForArm and SolverAssignedToArm are facts that specify
constraints about the kinematic solver and its relationship to the robot arm. Fact Coordinates-
FromGMT specifies that coordinates should come from the GeomagicTouch Device, and the
fact PluginsBelongToApp specifies that the plugins are connected to their parent component.
The fact AngleCalculation specifies that the solver transforms each coordinate to a set of arm
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angles. Listing 5.3 shows the rest of the constraints of the model, such as effector constraints,
pedal button constraints, and some configurations that hold for all the different instances of
one system.
To create individual family instances, I extract information about each specific robot arm
and extend its corresponding element type in the meta-model. The next step to specify the
safety-critical property in the meta-model, so that the analyzer can check the property for
each individual model. Listing 5.4 shows an individual robot arm model for a robot arm that
is named FrankenVREP. Note that the signatures are extended from the meta-model, and
66 //return the angles produced from a speci f ic coordinate
67 fun getArmAngles [ s : KinematicModel , c : Coordinate ] : one (ArmAngle ) {





73 //outputs should be in the range of solverResult
74 fact OutputConstraint {




78 //There i s one kinematic model for each robot arm
79 fact SingleKinematicModelForArm {
80 a l l r : RobotArm | one k : ArmType | r . armModel = k
81 }
82
83 //The kinematic model created for the instance corresponds to the arm type
84 fact SolverAssignedToArm {
85 KinematicModel in ArmType .∗ i nver seKSo lver
86 }
87
88 //a l l coordinates belong to GMT movements
89 fact CoordinatesFromGMT {
90 a l l c : Coordinate | a l l g : GeomagicTouch | c in g . input
91 }
92
93 //a l l Plugins belong to RobotApp
94 fact PluginsBelongToApp {
95 a l l p : Plugin | one r : RobotApp | p in r . i n c l ud e s
96 }
97
98 //for each coordinate there exists an angle
99 //and that angle i s in the solver result
100 fact AngleCalcu lat ion {
101 a l l c : Coordinate | some a : ArmAngle , s : KinematicModel | c−>a in s . s o l v e rRe su l t
102 }
Listing 5.2: Surgical robot family constraints in Alloy
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106 // i f the cautery effector i s used , scale can ’ t be used
107 // i f the non−cautery tool i s used , Grasper l imits
108 //should be added to loads
109 //and Cautery button shouldn ’ t be assigned
110 fact Ef f e c t o rCon s t r a i n t s {
111 (RobotArm . e f f e c to rType = Cautery Tissue Grasper or
112 RobotArm . e f f e c to rType = Cautery Shears or
113 RobotArm . e f f e c to rType = Cautery Hook )
114 => ScaleButton not in PedalButton . a s s i gned &&
115 CauteryButton in PedalButton . a s s i gned &&
116 GrasperLimits not in LoadedPlugins . l oads &&
117 Sca l e not in LoadedPlugins . l oads
118 e l s e
119 CauteryButton not in PedalButton . a s s i gned &&
120 ScaleButton in PedalButton . a s s i gned &&
121 GrasperLimits in LoadedPlugins . l oads
122 }
123
124 fact Sca lePeda lNeedsSca lePlug in {
125 ScaleButton in PedalButton . a s s i gned
126 => Sca l e in LoadedPlugins . l oads
127 }
128
129 fact PedalButtonConstraint {
130 a l l a , b : PedalButton | a != b imp l i e s some ( a . a s s i gned or b . a s s i gned )
131 }
132











144 fact MoreConfig {
145 #ArmType . a n g l e l im i t > 2 //up to four
146 #RobotControl . output > 1
147 #PedalButton = 3
148 #ButtonInte r f ace . setButtonForPedal = 3
149 #Coordinate = 1
150 }
Listing 5.3: Surgical robot family constraints in Alloy
the values are extracted from the code base. The property is then checked for each individual
robot arm.
Next, I present the property that should be checked for any individual robot model.
Listing 5.5 shows the property that the model is expected to satisfy. This property is formally
specified as Alloy assertion ArmAngleCorrect. Predicate ProducedFeedback describes when the






155 sig armangle extends ArmAngle{}
156 sig xyz input extends Coordinate {}
157
158 //plugins expected from a typical config f i l e
159 one sig GeomagicTouchPlugin instance extends GeomagicTouch plugin {}
160 one sig HomePos i t ion instance extends HomePosition {}
161 one sig Clutch in s tance extends Clutch Plug in {}
162 one sig IKSo lve r p lug in extends So lve rP lug in {}
163 one sig But ton In t e r f a c e i n s t anc e extends ButtonInte r f ace {}
164
165 one sig l o a d e d p l u g i n s o f extends LoadedPlugins {}{
166 GeomagicTouchPlugin instance +
167 HomePos i t ion instance +
168 Clutch in s tance +
169 IKSo lve r p lug in +
170 But t on In t e r f a c e i n s t anc e
171 in l oads
172 }
173 one sig IKSo lve r f ami ly extends SolverFamily {}{
174 c a l l s = FrankenBot
175 }
176 one sig FrankenBot extends KinematicModel{}
177 one sig FrankenVREP extends ArmType{}{
178 inver seKSo lver = FrankenBot
179 }
180 one sig FrankenVREPArm extends RobotArm{}{
181 armModel = FrankenVREP
182 }
183 one sig UsedGeomagicTouch extends GeomagicTouch {}{
184 f o r c e = Hapt icsDisab led
185 }
186 one sig Current Robot extends Robot {}{
187 arms = FrankenVREPArm
188 }
189 fact {
190 #ArmType . a n g l e l im i t = 4
191 #RobotControl . output = 4
192 #so l v e rRe su l t = 4
193 }
194
195 check ArmAngleCorrect f o r 5 but 8 Plugin
Listing 5.4: Individual Alloy model for the FrankenVREP robot arm
then relies on the ProducedFeedback predicate to state that all the output angles produced
by the solver fall into the set of angle limits.
The Alloy Analyzer then explores all possible behaviors of the system and identifies a
counterexample, if any, that corresponds to a violation of the assertion. The analysis is
exhaustive but bounded up to a user-specified scope on the size of the element types. The
counterexamples will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
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196 pred ProduceFeedback [ output : RobotControl . output ] {
197 output not in ArmType . a n g l e l im i t
198 some n o t i f i c a t i o n : GeomagicTouch . f o r c e | n o t i f i c a t i o n = HapticsEnabled
199 }
200
201 //assert i f the arm angle created by movement i s in the set of armangle limit
202 assert ArmAngleCorrect {
203 a l l a : RobotControl . output | a in ArmType . a n g l e l im i t
204 imp l i e s ProduceFeedback [ a ]
205 }
206 check ArmAngleCorrect f o r 4 but 5 Plugin
207 //What you should get as output :
208 //solverResult [Coordinate1 ] i s equal to ArmAngle0 unless ArmAngle0 i s not in
anglelimit
Listing 5.5: Excerpts from an Alloy specification for the family of surgical robots.
5.3 Feature Modeling
In parallel to building the formal model of the system, our research team set out to study
the variability and configurability of the system, as we intended to build a dependability case
that ensures the dependability of the entire family, not just one single configuration of the
robot system.
We use the concept of Software Product Lines (SPLs) [43], which are a set of systems that
share common features, and combination of those features that follows the system constraints
creates a valid product. In SPLs, we consider units that build the software as features.
Features can modify the functionality of the software system in certain ways. A configuration
is a set of features that construct a product, and each product in an SPL is a unique and
valid combination of features that does not violate the feature model’s constraints. SPLs
can be concisely represented by feature models. A feature model is a model that specifies
the features and the system constraints using a feature diagram, which is a hierarchical
and-or tree, and the cross-tree constraints. In basic feature models, features can have various
parent/children relationships such as mandatory and optional, which are self-explanatory, or,
which means at least one child must be selected, and alternative or, which means that only
one of the children must be selected. When a feature A requires feature B, the selection of A
implies the selection of B, and when a feature A excludes feature B, both features A and B
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cannot be present in the same product.
We consider the surgery robot system a product line, as the various software and hardware
components work together in different configurations and generating these configurations
requires complying with certain constraints. We gathered more information about the
product line by conducting a series of interviews with the robot developers focusing on
retrieving domain knowledge, as we lacked documentation on how the family was constructed.
Therefore, we needed to understand the necessary and optional components of each robot,
extract constraints and dependencies and map this to features. We used FeatureIDE as our
tool for creating the final model, which allowed us to reason about slices of the product
line [3].
From interviews, we learned the robot is a combination of two sets of configurable
hardware components, namely arm types and effectors on the ends, and configurable software
components. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the software components are collectively called
plug-ins, an array of plug and play configurable elements that can be used interchangeably to
drive all 15 arm types and 4 effectors in specific ways. We specified all the different arm types
that we found in the code base, 4 of which were of active use in the research lab at the time.
We also specified the five effectors that could be connected to the robot arms, and put them
in the Cautery tool and NonElectric Tool categories. There were specific constraints about
each set of effectors, and we categorized them to simplify writing the constraints for the
model. An excerpt of the feature model in Figure 5.4 shows the expanded ArmType feature,
which specifies 15 different robot arms.
The software components are divided into two parent features, LoadTimeConfigured and
RuntimeConfiguredPlugins. The load time configurations are related to the robot arm motor
configurations and the solver model that is associated with the robotic arm. Studying the
code base helped us learn about the corresponding solvers to each robot arm, and aided
us in writing the constraints for this part of the model. We also examined each inverse
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Figure 5.4: Feature Model: Arms
Figure 5.5: Feature Model: Runtime Configurations
kinematic solver code to find whether or not the ability of producing feedback force is
programmed in them, which is an essential feature related to our safety-critical property.
If a solver calculates the feedback forces, it implies that the configuration includes the
GT HapticFeedback feature. Figure 5.5 shows an excerpt of the feature model that includes
the child features of RuntimeConfiguredPlugins. We also included some features of the plug-ins,
namely AngleType, SelectedDevice, and ArmFunctions from the GeomagicTouch plugin, that
sets some specific features for the geomagic touch device.
We also add the constraints of the robot control system into the feature model. Tables 5.1
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and 5.2 present the list of constraints we imposed on the feature model. These constraints
were determined via both discussion with the developers and by studying the code and
configuration panels as selections are made. This was a challenging and iterative part of the
process. It turns out that there is a highly constrained hierarchy between the hardware and
software. Each arm type uses a single solver and each arm type either has haptic feedback or
not. Other constraints include physical limits of the graspers, for instance.
I have categorized the constraints in the tables for easier reading and understanding.
The Haptic feedback constraints are the ones that describe the features related to the haptic
feedback feature in the GeomagicTouch Device. Some of these constraints also specify whether
or not a solver produces the feedback force. It is necessary to note that the features starting
with AT are the arm types, and features starting with SM are solver models.
Solver constraints show the corresponding solvers for each arm. The do not work correctly
if they are used with a solver other than the one specified for them. If any arm is paired
with a wrong solver, the angle setpoint calculations will not be correct. Effector and pedal
constraints represent the some of the hardware/software constraints of the system. For
instance, if the scale plug-in is loaded, it implies that one of the buttons on the pedal is
assigned to the scale function. Another example is the constraint that states the fact that the
system cannot have the cautery and scale function at the same time. Some constraints about
different types of effectors are also presented. Arm side constraints represent the constraints
about input for different arm sides.
A full version of the feature model in XML format is presented in Appendix A of this
thesis.
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Constraint category Constraint imposed on the model
Haptic feedback
constraints
AT LouBizzle ∨ AT FiveDOFsolver ∨ AT ExtendingSixDOF ∨
AT FourDOFsolver ∨ AT FiveDOFcheater ∨
AT FiveDOFcheaterVREP ⇒ IK OutputForces ∧
GT HapticFeedback
AT SevenDOFsolver ∨ AT FourDOF needle ⇒ ¬IK OutputForces
∧ ¬GT HapticFeedback
AT SevenDOFsolver ∨ AT FourDOF needle ⇒ ¬IK OutputForces
∧ ¬GT HapticFeedback
SM KT TwoArmCoupledShoulder ⇒ ¬NK OutputForces ∧
¬GT HapticFeedback
SM KT TwoArmCoupledShoulder3DOF ∨
SM KT CoupledShoulder3DOF ∨
SM KT CoupledShoulderAndElbow3DOF ∨ SM KT CombinedBot
⇒ NK OutputForces ∧ GT HapticFeedback
AT FrankenVREP ⇒ ¬GT HapticFeedback
Solver constraints
AT TwoArmLouBot ⇒ SM KT TwoArmCoupledShoulder3DOF
AT MarkBot ⇒ SM KT CombinedBot
AT TomBot ⇒ SM KT TwoArmCoupledShoulder
AT TomShortArm ⇒ SM KT CoupledShoulderAndElbow3DOF
AT LouBot ∨ AT LouBotWithCamera ⇒
SM KT CoupledShoulder3DOF
AT SevenDOFsolver ∨ AT ExtendingSixDOF ∨
AT FourDOF needle ∨ AT FourDOFsolver ⇒
SM IK IKSolverNormal
AT LouBizzle ∨ AT FiveD0Fsolver ∨ AT FiveD0Fcheater ∨
AT FiveD0FcheaterVREP ⇒ SM IK IKSolver5DOF
AT FrankenVREP ⇒ SM IK FrankenBot
Table 5.1: List of constraints imposed on the feature model
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Constraint category Constraint imposed on the model
Effector and pedal
constraints
Cautery Tool ⇒ BI CauteryFunction ∧ ¬BI ScaleFunction
Scale ⇒ BI ScaleFunction
NonElectric Tool ⇒ GT ExpandOpen ∧ GT ClampClose ∧
GrasperLimits
Cautery Tool ⇒ ¬GT ExpandOpen ∧ ¬GT ClampClose ∧
¬GrasperLimits
EF Cautery Shears ⇒ ¬GT WristRotate
EF Cautery Tissue Grasper ∨ EF Cautery Hook ∨
NonElectric Tool ⇒ GT WristRotate
EF Cautery Hook ⇒ ¬GT EffectorBend
EF Cautery Tissue Grasper ∨ EF Cautery Shears ∨
NonElectric Tool ⇒ GT EffectorBend
¬(BI ScaleFunction ∧ BI CauteryFunction)
Arm side constraints
MC AS Left ⇒ ¬HP InvertXYZInput
MC AS Right ⇒ HP InvertXYZInput
MC AS Left ∧ IKSolver ⇒ ¬IK InvertXYZInput
MC AS Right ∧ IKSolver ⇒ IK InvertXYZInput
Table 5.2: List of constraints imposed on the feature model
5.4 Mapping Feature Model to Alloy Models
So far in the process, we have Alloy models and feature models that are extracted using two
different approaches, and while they overlap, they differ in granularity.
We extracted information about each robotic arm using code analysis, and this resulted in
fifteen Alloy models. In the Alloy models we only set the necessary values for some relations,
so they include Arm Type, Solver, Geomatic Touch, Haptic Feedback, and two plugins created
to manipulate inputs from Geomagic Touch, named Clutch and HomePosition. We set these
features and create slices of the feature model for each arm, using featureIDE [3] to calculate
the number of products that can be created for each robotic arm.
The process of mapping the features was not systematic or automated. However, we were




Our approach for testing the surgical software relies on Microsoft CodedUI [31] plugin, a tool
for testing user interfaces. It is capable of generating test cases based on manual interactions
with the GUI. It can replay the tests, though it is not able to reverse engineer the interface to
create a model of the system. CodedUI generates test cases automatically, but the generated
code is tightly coupled, and if modifications are made, they will be discarded after building
the project. Therefore, there is a need to extract the most relevant pieces of code, such as
how to navigate between interfaces, the input values, and to verify assertions. The testing
process was done in a semi-manual manner, and creating an automated testing process is
among our goals for future work.
We extracted the code generated by CodedUI into an auxiliary class and refactored it,
creating a class encapsulating the most important functionality of a test case, which is then
used as a template. Individual robot classes can call this class, and it will perform the
following steps: (1) Load configuration; (2) Go to solver plugin and select arm type, Go to
the controller and input values to move the arm; (3) Go to the solver and verify the output.
With all this information, it is then possible to generate a replayable test case for individual
robots, as they will follow the same steps, only varying in the solver, type of robot arm and




This chapter presents the analysis of the models, and the results of our study.
6.1 Finding Alloy Counter Examples
Our guidance for building Alloy models to search for counterexamples was primarily code
analysis. To cover the space of products of this robotic system, we needed to develop different
models for each different robotic arm. This resulted in fifteen Alloy models, one of which
is for the arm named FrankenVREP, and the robot’s specification is seen in Listing 5.4.
We are going to use this robot arm as a demonstration in this chapter, as we study one of
the generated counterexamples for this model and a configuration generated for this arm.
As mentioned earlier, the necessary features for the Alloy models include the Arm Type,
Solver, Geomatic Touch, Haptic Feedback, and two plugins created to manipulate inputs from
Geomagic Touch, named Clutch and HomePosition. Each individual Alloy model actually
represents 88 different products from the robot family, rather than a single robot. However,
this fact was not obvious as we built the analysis.
Since some of the features were not part of the code analysis and did not contribute to
the counter example, they do not appear in the Alloy model. However, we cannot be sure
that the analysis is precise and leaving out some features may in fact mean that we have
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over or under approximated the existence of the counter examples (see our discussion below
in testing). We did find a counter example for each of the models that did not include the
Haptic Feedback feature, and realized that the configurations of five out of fifteen arms can
potentially violate the safety-critical property. The robots that do use Haptic Feedback, do
not lead to this counter example – i.e., the haptics feature of the system provides physical
feedback to the surgeon anytime he or she tries to move the arm beyond its maximum range.
Figure 6.1 shows a counterexample that the Alloy Analyzer finds for FrankenVREP,
which indicates that the robot could show a faulty behavior and not inform the surgeon
on its physical limits. This counterexample describes a scenario in which FrankenBot, the
inverse kinematics solver associated with the FrankenVREP arm, has calculated four different
angle setpoints, but one the angles is outside the limit, i.e., not in the set of anglelimit.
This counterexample indicates that the robot cannot reach as far as the surgeon intends, so
naturally, the system should inform the surgeon of this situation. But as we can see, the
feedback forces are not calculated and the feedback force feature is disabled in this robot
(SurgeonBot/HapticsDisabled), and the surgeon will not be informed of the robot arm reaching
Figure 6.1: Visual representation of a part of a counterexample generated for FrankenVREP
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its physical limits. We get various counterexamples for each of the 15 arms, and Figure 6.1
shows one. We next discuss the results of the feature modeling and its mapping back to these
counter examples.
6.2 Feature Model
We went over our feature model design in Section 5.3. Our full feature model in an XML format
can be found in Appendix A. There are 1,320 valid potential surgical robot configurations
supported by this system.
As mentioned earlier, figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the high level features (Arm Type, Effector,
Load Time Configuration Options, Runtime Configuration Plugins). In these figures we focus
on the Runtime configuration plugins, in particular we show the branch of the feature model
that includes the Haptic Feedback (last leaf on right). We also show the breakout for the
ArmType and Effectors. The Arm type was further broken down during modeling because
the developers pointed out that only 4 arm types are currently in active use. The other 11
are physical arms that are no longer used. However, since this distinction is based solely on
domain knowledge and discussion with developers, it is not reflected in the Alloy models.
For the Alloy models, all 15 arm types were modeled because the code is still active and
discovered during code analysis. We also showed the cross tree constraints in tables 5.1 and
5.2.
Most of these found features are hard coded into the software which means when any arm
type is selected in FeatureIDE, we immediately have a small slice of the product containing
only 88 of the 1,320 products. An example configuration for the FrankenVREP that violates
the safety-critical property is shown in Table 6.2. As we know, the Geomagic Touch device
comes with a built in haptic feedback system. It can optionally be programmed by robot
designer/developers who wish to implement a haptic response to collisions detected by the
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IK Invert XYZ False
GT Angle Events Arm Bend, Effector Bend
Wrist Rotation Signal
GT Function Events ExpandOpen, ClampClose
Outputs XYZ Forces No
HomePosition Offset Grasper Offset
HomePosition Invert XYZ False
Clutch Button Assigned Yes
Home Position Btn. Assigned Yes
Cautery Button Assigned No
Scale Button Assigned Yes
Grasper Limits Assigned Yes
Angle Ranges [-180,45],[-90,30],
[-90,90],[0,140]
GT Angle Type Pitch,Roll,Yaw
Control Mode Relative Step
manipulated arms, by sending feedback of the forces encountered when colliding back to the
Geomagic software for processing. Only some of the designs in the existing surgical robots
are supportive of this feedback.
Upon close inspection of our models, we noticed FrankenVREP’s physics calculator,
FrankenBot, does not output directional forces. Because FrankenVREP’s inverse kinematic
solver does not compute directional forces, it cannot respond with feedback from the arm if
we reach a critical zone in the surgeon’s workspace. We have a constraint maintaining that
if forces are not calculated or outputted by the solver, then the GeomagicTouch does not
host its HapticFeedbackSignal feature, and signals don’t get sent from this module. We note
in our counterexample instance, that output forces is set to false. Correspondingly, we note
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in our counterexample instance, that only the Expand and Clamp signals are sent by our
Geomagic Touch, but not the haptic feedback signal. This is an omission we can easily detect
using our feature model instance checker.
This is only one example of the configurations the feature model can give us. However,
there are still 88 products that must be tested for each counter example if we are to confirm
the existence of the faulty property. I discuss this next.
6.3 Testing
Five of the robot arms led to the counter example (FiveDOFSolver, FourDOF needle,
FrankenVREP, SevenDOFSolver and TomBot). To validate that these are not exhibiting
false positives we built concrete test cases for each and observed the output. A failing test
case shows that the arm location stays fixed at the same point once it is pushed out of range.
A correct behavior shows a negative value in simulation when this occurs. We confirmed this
by also testing the robots that did not exhibit the counter example.
Our first problem for testing stemmed from the fact that each of the Alloy configurations
represents a set of robots (88 robots). We used the robot simulation mode for testing,
however, the simulator does not capture some of the hardware components that lead to the
larger number of robots. For instance, there are five different effectors that provide physical
movements such as shearing, cautery, grasping, etc. These are related to the robot hand,
which sits below the arm, and are not part of the simulator, and do not impact the solver
output which is needed for the counter example to change.
We, therefore, ignored the features that do not impact the arm extension and/or impact
whether or not the feedback is produced and tested only a single instance for each set of 88
products. This created a savings for us in terms of number of tests, however, the validity of
this approach is dependent on the quality of our code analysis. The features that we were
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not able to capture in our simulation include, Arm side (Left or Right), Effector Type (5
different effectors) and specific modules to move the hand which are related to the effectors
(Clamp Close, Expand Open, Wrist Rotate, Effector Bend). The behavior of Grasper Limit
and Scale plugins is not captured in our simulation of the system either, as they do not affect
the output angles of the robot arm.
For the five robots that we were able to simulate, we selected a range of input values/angles
on the console. As is common with configurable software, the configuration layer is orthogonal
to the input layer. We did not have an automated generation tool. We selected values from a
range that we expected would push the robot beyond a valid extension point (i.e. we used
domain knowledge to help us find the important boundary values). Using this approach we
were able to confirm that the counter examples do exist and the robot can be pushed outside
of its limit with no feedback returned. As the robot goes out of range, in the systems without
haptic feedback, the arm simply stops moving and records the same position over and over
again once it reaches its limit.
Interestingly one robot, TomBot, printed a message to the debug console telling the
developer that the arm was out of range. Theoretically, this could be passed to the physician




Discussion and Lessons Learned
7.1 Discussion
In this thesis, we demonstrated a comprehensive approach to building a dependability case
for families of systems and implemented our approach to a family of surgical robots. We
found a design flaw in the system, generated the features of all the faulty configurations, and
proceeded to test the system to realize if that potential problem can happen in a real scenario
in concrete configurations of the system. In this chapter, I discuss some of the challenges and
the lessons we learned in such a case study.
One of the challenges we faced in the initial stages of the study was the lack of comprehen-
sive documentation. So creating the models of the system was a challenging task, and still,
the models may not be a perfect representation of the system. We received a lot of help from
the engineers who developed the system, to create a model that is as accurate as it can be.
One specific characteristic of the system that was helpful for us in building the models is
the fact that the robot specifications in the system follow similar structures. This fact enabled
us to build a meta-model for the entire system and generate the individual models in a
semi-automated matter. If the developers decide to redesign or change the architecture or the
method of defining solvers and robots, our meta-model needs to be adjusted to accommodate
those changes.
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Unfortunately, the process of creating a dependability case cannot be fully automated.
We attempted to minimize the human effort by using code analysis to create the individual
Alloy models and semi-automatically create the tests; but creating the meta-model and
configuration files was a manual effort. Minimizing human effort can facilitate the adoption
of the method in practice.
Regarding the creation of test cases, one of the challenges was to create configuration
files for each robot arm. Configuration files for the software are crucial, since they contain
the plug-ins and motor configurations necessary to control the robot are. The validity of
these files is important because the robot will misbehave with an incorrect configuration of
the software. Because our testing approach is to exercise the application’s GUI to verify if a
counterexample holds for a given robot, the arm’s configuration file should be loaded by the
system. We had some of the robot arm configurations available, since the engineers working
with the system were currently using them. Still, to test the rest of the robotic arms, we
created the configuration files loading the absolute necessary plugins to control a robotic arm.
Another testing challenge was to construct oracles for test cases for each robot. We had
to inspect manually in the interface if a coordinate would place the arm in an invalid position.
If positive, we would create an assertion failing, showing that the arm is in a wrong position
and should produce force feedback. Otherwise, the test case would assert true.
One last testing challenge was to create completely automated tests. The testing process
is still in a semi-automated fashion. It would be necessary to create a tool that can rip the
interface to test other aspects of the system. This tool can ease the creation of test cases
because they would be created by traversing a data structure (e.g., a graph) derived through
the ripping process. Another direction is to use symbolic execution to test different input
values to move the arm and verify if it will produce force feedback.
Next, I present the lessons we learned while conducting this study.
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7.2 Lessons Learned
Conducting this study was a different experience as we had to consider not only the software
aspects of a system, but the physical aspects of the system. Working with a software system
designed and implemented by mechanical engineers was a valuable experience, as we witnessed
the difference between how software engineers describe the systems they have developed,
compared to how other engineers do. We mostly needed to understand the system from a
higher-level perspective, to be able to model the software and the property, and we needed an
overall idea of how the system operates. The mechanical engineers were eager to talk about
the low-level mathematical and implementation details and it took a lot of communication
for both teams to be on the same level about what kind of information was necessary and
useful to conduct this research.
Another important lesson we learned is that the architecture of the system plays a large
role and can help analysis. The way a system is designed and implemented has a significant
impact in conducting a dependability analysis. While dependencies among the various
robot software components and the external components made it challenging to get the
software running and working, its modular, plug-in-based nature helped us achieve a clear
understanding of the system and the event flow between various components, which in turn
facilitates the process of creating the dependability case.
Another lesson we learned is that the developers should consider the family of products.
One of the challenges we faced in concretizing counter examples and validating them was
the unavailability of the configuration files for the entire surgical robot family. We only had
access to the configurations for a small subset of robot instances that were currently being
used by the engineers working with the system. To check the property for the rest of the
robotic arms, we needed to create new configuration files which involved a tedious process of
loading and validating each of necessary plugins for a particular arm.
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Last but not least, we realized that it’s important to have methods to map feature models
to Alloy models. Our two views of the family of robots (Alloy and Feature models) differed
in their granularity and focus. The feature model included both hardware and software and
had some arbitrary divisions (e.g. the arm types), where as the Alloy model contained only
the code-based features that led to the counter example. However, together they tell the full




Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, I presented an approach to verifying the dependability of a family of systems
or product lines. We combined the problem frames approach and lightweight formal to model
a system and its safety-critical properties, and we use feature modeling to study and reason
about the variability in the product line. We then combine the information gathered from
both models to find configurations that don’t satisfy the safety-critical property, and we
validate whether or not the property is violated in a concrete configuration of the software
system.
To demonstrate our approach, we constructed a dependability case for a cyber-physical
safety-critical software product line, a robotic surgery system. In this case study, we used the
Alloy specification language and feature modeling to reason about (1) counterexamples that
allow the arm to move outside of range without providing feedback and (2) the variability
across the product line. We then applied testing to validate the counterexamples discovered.
While our Alloy models and feature models overlap, they are extracted using two different
approaches and hence differ in granularity. This fact led us to synthesize several lessons
learned and propose that researchers can use those to develop novel techniques for merging
feature and Alloy models, for modularizing their architectures and for more easily discovering
configurations for all necessary products.
As future work, we aim to construct dependability cases for different properties, as
52
different properties introduce different challenges in terms of modeling and code analysis.
Creating automatic and systematic mapping methods between models that represent the
system in different granularity and focus is also an interesting line of work. Another line of
future work is adding automated and rigorous testing methods to the approach, as we did
our testing semi-manually. At last, building physical test platforms is our goal for building
complete end-to-end dependability cases.
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<calculations Auto="true" Constraints="true" Features="true"
Redundant="true" Tautology="true"/>
<comments/>
<featureOrder userDefined="false"/>
</extendedFeatureModel>
